In this study, we examine the relationship between the U.S. real price of oil and factors that affect its movement over time: futures prices, the value of the dollar, exploration, demand, and supply. All of these variables are treated as jointly endogenous and a reduced form vector error correction model, testing for cointegration amongst the variables, is estimated. We find that for model specifications with short-term futures contracts, supply does indeed dominate price movements in the crude oil market. However, for specifications including longer-term contracts that are inherently more speculative, the real price of oil appears to be determined predominantly by the futures price. Moreover, there is empirical evidence of hoarding in the crude oil market: both oil stocks/inventories and futures prices are found to be positively cointegrated/correlated with each other. From a policy perspective, the results of this analysis indicate that if regulators really wanted to limit speculation in the oil market, it should keep the shorter-term futures contracts and eliminate the more speculative six months futures contracts.
Introduction
There are those who believe high oil prices are the result of market forces--limited supply meets endless demand, which makes barrels of crude more expensive. In an October 2004 National Review article, "The Oil Bubble: Set to Burst?" it was argued that oil prices, at that time $62 a barrel, would soon collapse. In ten months, oil was $73 a barrel.
1 All through oil's five-year price surge, rising to $105 per barrel as of March 2008, there have been many voices asserting that the precipitous rise is all the result of speculation--unsupported by the rudiments of supply and demand. 2 Speculation will increase oil prices through hoarding or increasing private inventories of crude. Som e espouse that inventories have rem ained at "norm al" levels, which im plies that the rise in oil prices is not the result of runaway speculation, but the consequence of decreasing supply and the rapid growth of developing econom ies like China and India. 3 We would like to point out that the notion of high futures prices reducing physical supplies through "hoarding" has nothing to do with a "norm al" level of inventories, but whether there exists a positive relationship between futures prices and oil stocks/ inventories.
In this study, the relationship between the price of oil and factors that affect its movement over time: futures prices, the value of the dollar, exploration, world demand, and world supply, will be examined. We will treat all of these variables as jointly endogenous and estimate a reduced form VEC model, testing for cointegration amongst the variables. The advantage to using this approach is twofold: first, the statistical results we get are not subject to endogeneity bias, since the models used have only predetermined or exogenous variables on the right-hand side. Second, given that we will test for cointegrating relationships, there is little concern about finding "spurious" associations among the variables that may exist when one simply correlates two or more random walks with each other (Enders (2004) ). Our fundamental purpose will be to determine just how much influence futures prices/speculation has on the real spot price of oil in the long-run. Index-fund investors do not buy physical commodities--they trade in futures contracts which are agreements to buy or sell a specific amount of a commodity at a set price by a specific date.
5 Thus, futures are benchmarks for prices across commodities markets. 6 An oil refiner may use futures to ensure up a quantity of oil for delivery at a later date or a farmer may use them to guarantee a price for his crop, but an index fund investor is only interested in riding a price trend by trading in contracts. 7 These investors in the fund are not financing new oil wells that could boost global crude supplies-they are just reaping price gains in the commodity markets. Thus, the current market price may not be based solely upon physical supply and demand.
Alternatively, Krugman (2008) and other economists believe that there is no such thing as an "oil bubble." He considers a scenario in which supply and demand balanced at a price of $25
per barrel, and speculation drove the price up to $100. What would occur? Drivers would cut back on driving, homeowners would turn down their thermostats, and owners of marginal oil wells would put them back into production. As a result, the balance between supply and demand would be replaced with a situation in which supply exceeded demand. This excess supply would drive prices back down--unless the excess was taken off the market. Thus, the only way speculation can increase oil prices is through hoarding. Krugman (2008) does not believe that speculation is prevalent in the market. He maintains that all through the period of the alleged bubble, inventories have remained at more or less normal levels. Therefore, the rise in oil prices is not the result of runaway speculation but rather the result of fundamental factors like the difficulty of finding oil and the rapid growth of emerging economies like China. As mentioned previously, the problem we have with this approach is the fact that the idea of speculation and high futures prices reducing physical supplies through "hoarding" has nothing really to do with what is considered "norm al" inventories, but whether increases/ decreases in futures prices are associated with increases/ decreases in oil stocks or inventories.
As mentioned previously, our purpose here will be to determine just how much of an influence speculation has had on the market price of oil. The time period used is from January 1988 to March 2008. The following variables will be utilized in this analysis,
See Appendix I for a complete description.
• t POIL -Crude Oil Spot Price at Cushing, Oklahoma (adjusted for inflation using the Personal Consumption Expenditure Chain Price Index), We decided to use the Spot Price at Cushing, Oklahoma, since it has historically been more of a U.S. crude oil "basket." Not only is it used as the basis for U.S.-traded oil futures, but it's also a key benchmark for U.S. production. The two, three, four, and six month's contract settlement prices are the futures prices. The dummy variable is used in an attempt to capture periods in which there were supply interruptions, e.g., Iraq's oil production is 900,000 barrels per day below prewar levels. Inclusion of this variable may be considered to be somewhat controversial, as one can identify many such "structural changes" over the past ten or so years. While this is case, we decided to include just the periods of the Gulf and Iraq wars since these are probably the most mentioned regarding their effects on the price of crude.
[ Insert Figure 1 Here ]
We begin by specifying four separate reduced-form Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model using the above jointly endogenous variables,
where, 
Alternatively, we can consider a VEC model with a deterministic term. The deterministic term, , can contain a constant, a linear trend, seasonal dummy variables, or nonstochastic regressors,
Since the data is monthly and has not been seasonally adjusted, will contain monthly seasonal dummy variables.
t D
If the matrix has a full rank (r = 7), all components of t X are I(0) (stationary or integrated of order zero). On the other hand, t X are stationary in first differences if the
. If the rank of the matrix is r < 7, there are (7 -r) linear combinations that are nonstationary and r stationary cointegrating relations. Note that the linearly independent vector, X β ′ , is stationary and this transformation is not unique unless r = 1. β is the matrix of cointegrating parameters and α is the matrix of weights with which each cointegrating vector enters the six equations of the VEC. α can also be considered as the matrix of the speed of adjustment parameters.
Our interest lies with the unique case where r = 1.
it X β ′ may be written as, α to restore equilibrium ( 0 i ν = ); that is, they satisfy the economic relations. The econometric use of the term "equilibrium" is any long-run relationship among nonstationary variables. Cointegration does not require that the long-run relationship be generated by market forces or by the behavioral rules of individuals. In Engle and Granger's (1987) use of the term, the equilibrium relationship may be causal, behavioral, or simply a reduced form relationship among similarly trending variables (Enders (2004) 
Since all of the variables are in natural logarithmic units, the ij θ and their estimates are elasticity coefficients and may be interpreted as the percentage change in the price of oil given a one percent change in the relevant explanatory variable, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the magnitude of the elasticities will tell us which variables have had the largest effect on the price of crude over this period.
Results
We first test each variable for the presence of a unit root using the more efficient Dickey
Fuller Test with GLS Detrending (Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) ). The results are in Table I . The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for each and it appears that the variables are all integrated of order one (I(1)).
[ Insert Table I Here ] As noted above, there are four futures price variables: two months, three months, four months, and six months contracts. This means that there are four models estimated using each futures price variable ( ). We determined the lag length, p, by fitting the VAR equation (1) for each model and using the lag length criteria test in Eviews 6.0.
2,3, 4,6 i = 13 The lag length tests were performed using the likelihood ratio test statistic recommended by Sims (1980) . 14 Following this, the Johansen procedure (Johansen (1988) ) was used to test for cointegration and the results may be found in Table II . It is interesting to note that the null hypothesis of r = 0 is 13 EViews 6.0 was the software that was used for this entire analysis. 14 See Enders (2004) , page 363 for a complete explanation of the procedure. For reasons of brevity, the results will be made available upon request from the authors. [ Insert Table II Here ]
The estimation results for equation (5) A one percent increase in the shorter-term two and three-months contracts is associated with a close to one percent increase in the real price of crude-a proportionate or unitary elastic response. However, a one percent increase in the six-months contract futures price is associated with a 1.6 percent increase in the real price of oil-a more than proportionate or elastic response.
What is even more interesting is the magnitude of the coefficients of the remaining variables as
15
The estimation results of the VEC model will be made available upon request from the authors. In one sense, this is not a surprising finding given that fact that a six months futures contract would be inherently more speculative than the shorter contract periods. Therefore, the six months futures price, not supply nor demand, appears to be driving the real price of oil in the market, ceteris paribus. These results imply that if the six months futures price were to fall by twenty percent, the real price of crude would decline by more than thirty percent from its present-day levels.
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http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-petruno24-2008may24,1,6762856.column. 17 We should note that the elasticity coefficient on futures price for each equation is the second largest (after supply) in the two, three, and four months model (Table III) .
Conclusion
We have found that for model specifications that include shorter-term futures contracts, supply does indeed dominate price movements in the crude oil market. However, for longerterm contracts, the real price of oil appears to be determined principally by the futures price.
In order for the relationship between futures prices and the market price of oil outlined above to be valid, two associations would have to exist: futures prices and inventories would have to be positively cointegrated and supply and inventories would have to be inversely cointegrated. As mentioned previously, the only way futures prices/speculation can increase oil prices is through hoarding which would increase inventories and remove oil from the market.
There is empirical evidence of hoarding in the crude oil market. The estimation results of the following equations may be found in Tables IV and V, 4 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Wells Drilled in U.S., Total Oil 5 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Total World Oil Supply (Mil. b/d) 
